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FORUM

Recent Developments
Administrative Adjudication, an Idea Whose
Time Has Come
by David H. Hugel, Esq.

Primarily in response to an overwhelming criminal and traffic court
caseload, the State of New York in
1970 became the first jurisdiction in
this country to remove minor traffic
offenses from the criminal court
system. This was implemented by
an innovative pilot project in New
York City for processing such matters administratively by an adjudication division within the State Motor Vehicle Division. The success of
this project has resulted in its being
expanded to include additional jurisdictions within New York State
and the implementation of similar
administrative adjudication programs in Rhode Island and the District of Columbia, as well as in the
initiation of pilot projects in the city
of Seattle, Washington and three
California counties.
Simply stated, administrative adjudication applies modern technology and procedures to the trial of
motor vehicle offenses. Administrative adjudication removes the trial
of such cases from overcrowded
court dockets by transferring responsibility for the factual determination of whether or not a motorist committed a given offense to
an administrative agency, such as
the motor vehicle department, or
quasi-judicial forum where trained
hearing officers first make that
judgment, and then invoke appropriate administrative licensing sanctions.
It should be emphasized that this
simplified procedure applies only to
minor traffic offenses which have
been decriminalized and do not carry
the possibility of incarceration. It is
also important to note that motorists retain their right to an ultimate
judicial review of any administra-

tive determination, although the
New York State experience which
provides for an intermediate administrative review indicates that nearly
all cases are resolved in the administrative forum making further appeal to the courts unnecessary.
Among the acknowledged benefits of administrative adjudication is
the reduction of court caseloads and
delays associated with the trial of
such cases within the court system.
According to one comprehensive
study evaluating New York's administrative adjudication system,
"elimination of the almost 800,000
traffic cases from the criminal courts
had freed a large number of judges
to devote their attention to more serious criminal matters. Estimates of
the actual number have varied, but
go as high as eighteen. It was felt
that this has had a salutary effect
on criminal court backlogs and delays." See A Report on the Status and
Potential Implications of Decriminalization of Moving Traffic Violations, U.S.
Department of Transportation,
NHTSA Contract No. DOT-HS-1231-179, Arthur Young and Company
(1972).
Viewed from a highway safety
perspective, the greatest benefit of
administrative adjudication is that it
reduces the time between when an
offense occurs, when it is adjudicated and when appropriate sanctions are applied. Instead of being
required to await a formal court proceeding, followed by the inherent
delay between the time of that trial
and when its results are acted upon
by the driver licensing authority, a
consolidated administrative adjudication system allows the immediate
imposition of administrative sanctions following a determination of

guilt by the reviewing authority.
In addition, combining the adjudication of guilt hearing with administrative sanction procedures is
more convenient for motorists. They
need only appear at one proceeding
which is conducted in a more relaxed atmosphere than the formal
courtroom setting where traffic cases
are normally tried. Studies have also
shown that, once implemented, an
administrative adjudication system
should be more cost effective than
the traditional court/administrative
hearing system since it reduces personnel and other costs associated
with operating a dual system.
Administrative adjudication, being
non-criminal in nature, also allows
for relaxed rules of evidence and a
lesser burden of proof, such as clear
and convincing evidence. Under
some systems, motorists who do not
contest the basic facts, but who wish
to present mitigating evidence may
tender a plea of guilty with explanation, thereby saving untold hours
of time for police officers who need
not appear at trial since the basic
facts of the incident are uncontroverted. To fully appreciate the ramifications of handling traffic offenses administratively, one must
remember that in the majority of
states traffic offenses are currently
classified as misdemeanors and tried
in the criminal courts. As such, they
are subject to the same rules and
procedures, and offenders are protected by the same constitutional
safeguards as for any other crime.
The extent of those Constitutional
rights need not be examined here.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has made it clear that these rights
include, depending upon whether
or not incarceration may be imposed, the right to counsel, Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); and the
right to jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In such cases
the state also has a high burden of
proof, since it must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainty.
While such safeguards are essential to protect the rights of defen-

dants charged with criminal offenses from government abuses, they
have no place in a modern driver
control system whose goal is not to
punish the guilty, but to identify
the errant driver and to take corrective action designed to prevent
the driver from causing injury or
damage to himself or others. Yet, in
the great majority of states, traffic
offenses are still tried in the criminal
court system as they have been since
the first ordinances and laws were
enacted to control the horseless carriage when it appeared on American highways around the turn of
the century.
There is little justification for continuing to try minor traffic offenses
in a court system burdened by caseloads, when viable alternatives are
available which could relieve this
situation. Changing traditional
methods of doing business, particularly those involving long established court procedures, however,
often requires overcoming entrenched opposition from special interests which may feel threatened
by such changes. It is ironic that
such resistance often comes from
those who would benefit the greatest from proposed changes. Law
enforcement officials, the defense
bar, the courts and the motorists
themselves, must fully appreciate
the potential benefits to be derived
from changing current adjudication
procedures before they can be expected to support any modification
of the present system. The adoption
of this innovative alternative to the
traditional method for handling
traffic offenses, would be a small,
but significant step toward modernizing our archaic court system.
Streamlining the driver control system by consolidating adjudication
and sanctioning procedures should
also result in a more efficient and
effective highway safety effort.
(David H. Hugel first became interested in
administrativeadjudicationas a former staff
aide and public information officer for the
Commissioner of the Maryland Department
of Motor Vehicles. Mr. Hugel, a 1973 graduate of University of Baltimore School of Law,
has served as an Assistant State's Attorney

for Baltimore County, and as Assistant
Counsel with Northwestern University's
Traffic Institute. In his present position as
Maryland State's Attorney's Coordinator,
Mr. Hugel develops and conducts legal education programs for state prosecutors. He
also publishes a bi-monthly newsletter devoted to reviewing and interpreting current
appellate court decisions, and serves on numerous boards and committees, including the
Governor's Task Force on the DrinkingDriver.
Mr. Hugel has lectured extensively on legal
and highway safety issues.)
In Harper v. Harper,
Md.
,
448 A.2d 916 (1982), The Court of
Appeals took the opportunity to refine the approach to the classification and division of marital property. This decision will affect how
Maryland courts will determine an
equitable distribution of property in
an action for divorce under Maryland's Marital Property Disposition
in Divorce and Annulment Act
[hereinafter referred to as MPDA],

Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.
§§ 3-6A-01 to -07 (1974, 1980 Repl.
Vol. & 1981 Cum. Supp.).
The decision included a dispute
over the division of the interests of
the divorcing spouses in a parcel of
land which the husband had acquired, and paid for in part prior to
the marriage, pursuant to a land installment contract and the spouses'
respective interests in the house that
was constructed on the property by
the expenditure of marital funds. Mr.
Harper argued that the lower courts'
decisions, which divided the parties' interests in the land and house
equally, were inequitable as the parcel of land had been acquired prior
to the marriage. The Court of Appeals upheld in part and reversed
in part the lower appellate court's
holding and ordered the case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with its
opinion.
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In so doing, the court indulged in
a lengthy review of the statutory
history of MPDA and of the prevailing doctrines which other states
with similar statutes have employed
in enforcing those statutes. While
stressing the importance of protecting the interests of spouses who had
made monetary and nonmonetary
contribution to the marital unit and
residence, the court considered and
rejected two competing theories
adopted by a majority of its sister
jurisdictions: (1) the "inception of
title theory," which grants title to
the spouse who had acquired an equitable right to the property prior to
the marriage, even though not perfected, and (2) the "transmutation
of property theory," which classifies property as marital for the purpose of equitable distribution when
there has been a contribution of
marital funds to nonmarital property. Instead, the court held that
under the MPDA, the appropriate
analysis to be applied is the "source
of funds theory."
Under that theory, when property is acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital and
marital property, the property
is characterized as part nonmarital and part marital. Thus,
a spouse contributing nonmarital property is entitled to an
interest in the property in the
ratio of the nonmarital investment to the total nonmarital and
marital investment in the property. The remaining property is
characterized as marital property subject to an equitable distribution.
Harper, -- Md. at
929.

-, 448 A.2d at

The court stated that the "source
of funds theory" is consistent with
the language of § 3-6A-01(e), which
sets forth an exclusive list of nonmarital property and indicates a legislative intent that certain property
not be subject to equitable distribution, specifically, property which
is acquired prior to the marriage.

Additionally, to best effectuate the
imposition of its holding, the court
adopted an interpretation of the term
"acquired" appearing in § 3-6A01(e) as:
The on-going process of making payment for property. Tibbets, 406 A.2d at 77. Under this
definition, characterization of
nonmarital or marital property
depends upon the source of
each contribution as payments
are made, rather than at the time
legal or equitable title or possession of the property is obtained.
Id. at

-, 448 A.2d at 929.

Thus, in light of the court's newly
adopted source of funds theory and
interpretation of the term "acquired," it remanded the case to the
trial court so that there might be a
determination as to: (1) the source
of the funds expended for the parcel
of land and the improvements made
thereon by the spouses individually
and as a unit; (2) the degree to which
the parcel of land and the marital
residence are to be characterized as
marital and/or nonmarital; and (3)
the value of the marital property.
The aforementioned factors are all
relevant in the court's determination of an equitable distribution of
the property in issue.
The decision adds some clarification to the MPDA which to this
date remains a statute relatively undefined by case law. It seems to re
affirm that Maryland courts have little or no intention of becoming a
community property jurisdiction, as
evidenced by the Court of Appeals's rejection of the "inception of
title theory" and the "transmutation of property theory."

Recent

Developments in
Maryland's Intestate
Succession Law
The 1982 amendment to Md. Est.
& Trusts Code Ann. § 3-102 (1974),
is a welcome change to Maryland's
intestate succession law. The legislature's purpose for enacting the
amendment was to reflect the intestate's desire to have the greater
portion of the estate go to the surviving spouse.
Under the statute as it existed prior
to 1981, a surviving spouse received
only one third of the deceased's estate if there was a surviving issue.
If there was no surviving issue, but
a surviving parent of the deceased,
then the spouse's share of the estate
increased to one half. And, if there
were no surviving issue or parents,
but a surviving sibling of the deceased, then the spouse's share became one half of the residue of the
estate plus $4,000.00. Thus, the only
way a surviving spouse was entitled
to receive the entire estate was if
there were no surviving issue, parents or siblings of the deceased. Md.
Est. & Trust Code Ann. § 3-102
(1974).
The 1981 amendments to the law
increased the spouse's distribution
of the estate to one half regardless
of whether there was a surviving
issue or parent. Absent a surviving
issue or parent, the spouse received
the entire estate regardless of
whether or not there was a surviving sibling. Md. Est. & Trust Code
Ann. § 3-102 (1981).
The 1982 amendment gives the
surviving spouse an even greater
portion of the estate if the surviving
issue is an adult as opposed to a
surviving minor issue. If the surviving issue is an adult, then the spouse
will be entitled to the first $15,000
of the estate plus one half of the
residue. The same entitlement ap-

